Although there is an emerging consensus that disgust plays a role in human morality, it remains unclear whether this role is limited to transgressions that contain elements of physical disgust (e.g., gory murders, sexual crimes), or whether disgust is also involved in "pure" forms of morality. To address this issue, we examined the relationship between individual differences in the tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli (i.e., trait physical disgust) and reactions to pure moral transgressions. Across two studies, individuals higher in trait physical disgust judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than did their low-disgust counterparts, and were also more likely to moralize violations of social convention. Controlling for gender, trait anxiety, trait anger, and social conservatism did not eliminate trait disgust effects. These results suggest that disgust's role in morality is not limited to issues of purity or bodily norms, and that disgust may play a role in setting the boundaries of the moral domain.
Figures of speech such as "you make me sick" have long hinted that moral transgressions may trigger disgust. Indeed, when people are asked to list disgusting stimuli, they spontaneously describe moral transgressions as well as physical stimuli such as body products, injuries, and spoiled food (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997) . Participants who are presented with moral transgressions rate them as being disgusting (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Simpson, Carter, Anthony, & Overton, 2006) , and also show implicit signs of disgust such as increased completion of physical-disgust-related word stems (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) . Physical and moral disgust elicit similar facial expressions (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) , and experimentally inducing physical disgust makes moral judgments more severe (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) .
Although there is an emerging consensus that moral transgressions can elicit disgust, it remains unclear whether this effect is limited to certain kinds of transgressions. In particular, there is debate about whether moral disgust is primarily associated with transgressions that contain physical disgust stimuli (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) . Variously known as "purity," "bodily norm," or "divinity/sanctity" violations, such transgressions generally involve minority sexual practices (e.g., incest, bestiality) or food taboos (e.g., cannibalism, gluttony). Although it is clear that these types of transgressions elicit disgust, a more controversial issue is whether "pure" transgressions-those do not contain physical disgust stimuli-can also evoke disgust.
One piece of evidence in this debate has been the effect of individual differences in trait physical disgust-the tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli-on moral judgments. On the one hand, there is some evidence that people who are high in trait physical disgust judge pure transgressions more harshly than do their low-disgust counterparts. For example, in one study, increasing trait physical disgust was associated with more severe judgments about pure transgressions such as theft and fraud (Jones & Fitness, 2008) , consistent with the idea that disgust's role in the moral domain is not limited to physically disgusting transgressions. On the other hand, there is also evidence that judgments about pure transgressions may not be related to differences in trait physical disgust. For example, individuals higher in trait physical disgust reported more conservative attitudes toward gay marriage and abortion-issues related to sexual norms, and hence relevant to physical disgust-but not toward "pure" issues such as welfare and gun control (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009) . In another study, individuals who reported experiencing disgust more frequently also endorsed stronger punishment of physically disgusting transgressions such as sexual promiscuity, but not pure transgressions such as interrupting a meeting or leaving small tips (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009 ). Numerous differences between these three studies could potentially account for the conflicting results. Each used dramatically different pure moral transgression items, varying not only the nature of the transgression but also the complexity of the stimuli (e.g., theft is often unambiguously wrong, whereas social issues generally involve competing moral claims; leaving a small tip may not be a moral transgression at all if service was poor). The outcome measures also differed widely, from judgments of punishment severity (Horberg et al., 2009; Jones & Fitness, 2008) , to estimates of the likelihood that a suspect was guilty (Jones & Fitness, 2008) , to agreement with a conservative versus liberal stance (Inbar et al., 2009) . Notably, no study to date has examined judgments of moral wrongness, the most direct measure of moral preference. Our aim in the current research was therefore to examine the relationship between individual differences in trait physical disgust and wrongness judgments about straightforward, unambiguous, and pure moral transgressions. The null hypothesis is no relationship between trait physical disgust and judgments about pure transgressions.
A secondary aim was to test whether trait physical disgust might be related to the tendency to moralize more ambiguous social norms. Moralization occurs when an object or behavior that was previously morally neutral acquires moral valence (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997) ; a good example is the change in attitudes toward slavery over the past few centuries. If trait physical disgust is related to differences in the tendency to view social norms in a moral light, it would suggest that disgust may play an important role in defining the boundaries of the moral domain. To test this possibility, we examined the relationship between trait physical disgust and the tendency to moralize social conventions such as how to address authority figures, appropriate clothing, polite behavior, and so forth. There is considerable variation in the degree to which social conventions are viewed as being moral issues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Shweder et al., 1997) , and we aimed to test whether differences in trait physical disgust might explain some of this variability.
Two studies were conducted to examine the role of trait physical disgust in wrongness judgments and moralization of pure moral transgressions and social conventions. In Study 1, high-and lowtrait-disgust participants were recruited from an undergraduate population. In Study 2, unselected participants were recruited via the Internet. We predicted that in both samples, individual differences in trait physical disgust would be associated with more severe wrongness judgments and with moralization of transgressions that do not contain references to physical disgust stimuli.
Study 1 Method
Participants. To recruit participants who were high and low in trait physical disgust, about 1,200 students in a large introductory psychology class completed a shortened (eight-item) version of the Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) . Forty-two individuals who scored in the bottom or top quarters of the sample were recruited for the experimental session, in return for course credit or $10. Computer problems occurred for two participants, for a final sample size of 40 (25 female, 1 unreported).
Questionnaires. To confirm their high-or low-trait-physicaldisgust status, participants completed the full DS (Haidt et al., 1994) during the experimental session. The DS is a 32-item self-report questionnaire that measures an individual's tendency to experience disgust toward a variety of physical stimuli, including spoiled foods, body products such as feces and vomit, contact with death, blood and gore, minority sexual practices, and physical contact with strangers. The DS does not measure disgust toward purely moral stimuli.
To examine the specificity of any DS effects, we also collected a measure of trait anxiety, the Multidimensional Anxiety Questionnaire (MAQ; Reynolds, 2003) . The MAQ is a 40-item selfreport measure of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) symptoms of trait anxiety, including social concerns, worrying, negative affectivity, and physiological symptoms of anxiety.
Moral stimuli. To examine the relationship between trait physical disgust and moral judgments, we developed 48 one-or two-sentence scenarios describing an action performed by a third party (see Appendix 1). All the scenarios were set in a high school, an environment in which many different types of social norms are salient and of recent experience to first-year undergraduates. Three types of scenarios were developed. Moral transgressions (n ϭ 16) described unambiguous, deliberate moral wrongs such as harm or theft (e.g., "a student steals a library book that other students need to pass an exam"; "a female student slaps another girl in the face"). Transgressions of social convention (n ϭ 16) involved violations of school rules (e.g., "a student asks the teacher a question in class without raising her hand first"; "a student wears a t-shirt and jeans to school instead of the school uniform"). Finally, neutral actions (n ϭ 16) described everyday events (e.g., "a student sits down at a table in the library and reads").
Procedure. After arriving at the laboratory and giving informed consent, participants read each scenario, then rated the action described on wrongness (1 to 9 scale: not at all to extremely) and permissibility (allowed or not allowed). Items that were judged to be impermissible were then probed for moralization. To do so, we drew upon a well-validated finding from the moral development literature, namely, that moral norms are viewed as being independent of an authority's dictates (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987) . In other words, violating a moral norm is not wrong because an authority figure says it is wrong; the wrongness is intrinsic to the transgression. As a result, violating a moral norm would be wrong even if an authority figure said that it was acceptable. In a high school environment, the school principal is generally the highest authority. Therefore, to examine moralization, participants were asked to decide whether actions that they initially judged to be impermissible would be "OK if the principal said it was OK" or "not OK even if the principal said so." The latter judgment suggests that the norm in question has been moralized, since its wrongness is independent of the principal's authority.
Finally, after completing all the ratings, computerized versions of the DS and MAQ were administered.
Results
Examination of scores on the 32-item DS revealed a clear bimodal distribution. We therefore split the sample into two groups at 16, the typical DS mean for adults (Haidt et al., 1994) . MAQ scores were more normally distributed and were therefore treated as a continuous variable in all analyses. One individual scored This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. more than 3.5 standard deviations above the mean on the MAQ; however, excluding this individual from analyses did not affect the results, and we therefore opted to include this data point in all analyses. Descriptive statistics for the high-and low-DS groups are given in Table 1 .
The effect of DS group on wrongness judgments was analyzed using a mixed measures ANOVA with factors of DS group (high/ low) and scenario type (moral/conventional/neutral). This analysis revealed main effects of DS group, F(1, 38) ϭ 14.5, p Ͻ .001, scenario type, F(2, 76) ϭ 578, p Ͻ .001, and an interaction, F(2, 76) ϭ 4.03, p ϭ .004. As shown in Figure 1A , moral transgressions were rated as more wrong than conventional transgressions, consistent with past work (Turiel et al., 1987) . High-DS participants rated both moral and conventional transgressions as more wrong than low-DS participants (moral: t[38] ϭ 3.66, p ϭ .001; conventional: t[38] ϭ 3.29, p ϭ .002), with the interaction suggesting that this effect may be particularly pronounced for the conventional transgressions.
Given the higher proportion of females in the high-DS group, there is some concern that the results could be due to gender differences rather than differences in trait physical disgust. Similarly, MAQ and DS scores were significantly correlated (r ϭ .367, p ϭ .02), raising the possibility that the results could be due to general negative affectivity rather than disgust per se. To control for any potential influence of these variables, we reran the ANOVA using gender and MAQ scores as covariates. 1 This ANCOVA replicated the previous analysis, with main effects of DS group, F(1, 35) ϭ 7.10, p ϭ .012, and scenario type, F(2, 70) ϭ 17.3, p Ͻ .001, and a DS Group ϫ Scenario Type interaction, F(2, 70) ϭ 4.06, p ϭ .021). Thus, an increased tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli is related to more severe judgments of moral and conventional transgressions, over and above any contributions of gender and trait anxiety.
We next examined whether trait physical disgust might be related to moralization. Impermissibility judgments for the neutral scenarios were near floor and were not analyzed further. For each participant, we computed the proportion of items judged to be impermissible that were also rated as authority-independent (i.e., the proportion of items that were moralized). Consistent with previous work and with the classic definition of a moral transgression (Turiel et al., 1987) , the moral scenarios were almost universally judged to be independent of authority: All but three participants judged that 100% of the transgressions were authorityindependent, for a mean of 96.7% moralization across participants (SD ϭ 16%). Given this ceiling effect for moral transgressions, we therefore focused our analysis on the conventional transgressions, which had a mean moralization of 32.4% (SD ϭ 26%). An independent-samples t test revealed that high-DS participants were more likely to moralize conventional transgressions-viewing them as being independent of authority-than were low-DS participants, t(37) ϭ 2.51, p ϭ .016 ( Figure 1B) . As before, we reran this analysis using gender and MAQ scores as covariates. 2 In the ANCOVA, the effect of DS group dropped to marginal significance, F(1, 34) ϭ 3.50, p ϭ .070.
Discussion
Study 1 provides initial evidence that normal variation in trait physical disgust is related to moral judgments outside of the purity domain. Compared with their low-disgust counterparts, participants who scored higher on the DS rated both moral and conventional transgressions as being more wrong, even when these items did not refer to physical disgust stimuli such as bodily or sexual taboos. Controlling for gender and trait anxiety did not eliminate this effect. High-DS participants were also more likely to moralize violations of social convention, viewing them as being morally wrong independently of an authority's dictates. A caveat is that the effect of DS dropped to marginal significance once we controlled for gender and MAQ scores, thus providing only suggestive evidence that trait physical disgust contributes to moralization, over and above the effects of gender and anxiety.
Although Study 1 attempted to control for two potential confounds, our sample was quite small for such analyses. Moreover, there are other variables that could potentially account for the influence of trait physical disgust on moral judgment. One potential candidate is anger, which is often correlated with disgust toward moral transgressions (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013 ). Another is conservatism, which is correlated with differences in trait physical disgust (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013) . Study 2 therefore examined a larger sample of unselected participants, and included measures of trait anger and social conservatism in addition to trait anxiety.
Study 2 Method
Participants. A total of 302 individuals were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and completed the study online in return for monetary compensation. Respondents were over 18 years of age and were restricted to individuals with U.S. IP addresses and a history of 95% acceptable performance on other MTurk tasks. Previous work has demonstrated that data quality can be improved using an instructional manipulation check designed to ensure that participants are reading the instructions (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009 ). Because of the online format and the relatively large number of questions to be answered, we included such a check in Study 2. Nine individuals who responded incor-1 Gender was a significant predictor of wrongness ratings, F(1, 35) ϭ 4.65, p ϭ .038. However, gender effects were not predicted a priori and occurred only inconsistently across Studies 1 and 2. We are therefore reluctant to attribute much importance to them. MAQ scores were not a significant predictor of wrongness ratings (F Ͻ 1).
2 Neither gender (F Ͻ 1) nor MAQ scores, F(1, 33) ϭ 3.70, p ϭ .063, significantly predicted moralization. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
rectly were eliminated. One other participant who failed to respond to four items on our measure of disgust and was excluded. 3 The final sample size was 292 (139 female, 1 other gender identity; mean age ϭ 32 years, SD ϭ 10.6, range ϭ 18 to 72). Questionnaires. As in Study 1, participants completed the MAQ (Reynolds, 2003) . Participants also completed the Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007) , the Trait scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-T; Spielberger, 1988), and the Henningham Social Conservatism Scale (SC; Henningham, 1996) . The DS-R is a revised version of the DS in which a number of psychometric improvements have been made. Sexual disgust items have been removed due to low variability, and the DS-R provides three reliable subscales: Core Disgust (concerned with body products, invertebrates/rodents, and foods), Contamination Disgust (concerned with the threat of contamination), and Animal Reminder Disgust (concerned with body envelope violations and death). The DS-R includes both yes-no and 3-point rating sections; missing data points were replaced with the individual's modal response for that section. The STAXI-T is a 10-item measure of participants' general tendency to experience anger (e.g., "I fly of the handle," "I am quick tempered"). The SC measures support or opposition to 12 cornerstone social issues, including premarital sex, gay rights, immigration, and crime. To improve psychometrics, responses were made on a 5-point bipolar scale (strongly oppose to strongly support), rather than the original yes-no format. One item, "Asian immigration," was changed to "Mexican immigration," so as to be more relevant to American respondents. For the MAQ, STAXI-T, and SC, missing data were replaced with the individual's mean response. For all scales, the proportion of missed items was very low (see online supplemental materials for details).
Moral stimuli. To shorten the experiment for the Internet format, Study 2 used a subset of the moral and conventional stimuli from Study 1. In an effort to narrow the gap in mean wrongness ratings between the moral and conventional stimuli, we selected the eight conventional scenarios with the highest mean wrongness ratings and the eight moral scenarios with the lowest mean wrongness ratings. These items are starred in Appendix 1 of the online supplemental materials.
Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants read each scenario, then rated the action described on wrongness (1 to 5 scale: not at all to extremely) and permissibility (allowed or not allowed). Items that were judged to be impermissible were then probed for moralization as in Study 1: Participants were asked to decide whether actions that they initially judged to be impermissible would be "OK if the principal said it was OK" or "not OK even if the principal said so." The latter judgments were taken to indicate that the relevant norm had been moralized.
After completing all the ratings, computerized versions of the DS-R, STAXI-T, MAQ, and SC were administered. Participants were also presented with an instructional manipulation check in this phase, as described in Study 1 of Oppenheimer et al. (2009) .
Results
Exploratory factor analysis on wrongness ratings. Given the large data set in Study 2, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis on wrongness ratings for each item to examine patterns in how the different scenarios were evaluated. Principal axis factoring and a varimax rotation were conducted. Using Kaiser's rule, two components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained, accounting for 39.7% and 12.8% of total variance, respectively. Table S1 of the online supplemental materials gives the factor loadings for the different items. All eight conventional items, but none of the moral items, loaded at Ͼ0.5 on the first factor. By contrast, six out of eight moral items, and none of the conventional items, loaded at Ͼ0.5 onto the second factor. Thus, the majority of our items conformed well to the theoretical distinction between morality and social convention (Turiel et al., 1987) . Two moral This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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items were moderately loaded on both factors: These items described jumping ahead in line and telling secrets, in contrast to the mental or physical harm in the other six moral items. These items may have features of both domains, although additional research is needed to confirm this possibility. Nonetheless, this potential heterogeneity in the moral category did not affect the results: Repeating the analyses with these items excluded resulted in the same patterns of significance. Relationship between trait physical disgust and moral judgments. Given the large sample size in Study 2, and that we did not preselect high-and low-DS groups, we used multiple regression to examine the influence of trait measures on moral judgment (Table 2; see Table S2 of the online supplemental materials for zero-order correlations). Replicating Study 1, trait physical disgust as measured by the DS-R was a significant independent predictor of wrongness judgments about both moral (Figure 2A) and conventional transgressions ( Figure 2B) , even when controlling for gender, trait anger (STAXI-T), social conservatism (SC), and trait anxiety (MAQ). 4 Turning to moralization, and similar to Study 1, the overall moralization of moral transgressions was near ceiling (M ϭ 94.1%, SD ϭ 15%), whereas moralization of conventional transgressions was much lower (M ϭ 27.8%, SD ϭ 22%). We therefore focused on conventional transgressions. Replicating Study 1, trait physical disgust significantly predicted moralization of conventional transgressions (Figure 2C ), over and above any contribution of gender, STAXI-T, SC, and MAQ.
As mentioned, the DS-R used in Study 2 has reliable subscales that measure core, animal reminder, and contamination disgust. We therefore performed an exploratory analysis to examine whether their relationships with moral judgments may differ. The regression analyses described here were repeated with the three DS-R subscales, gender, STAXI-T, MAQ, and SC as predictors. 5 Table S3 of the online supplemental materials gives the results of these analyses, illustrating a number of interesting findings. First, animal reminder disgust was not a significant predictor of wrongness judgments or moralization for either moral or conventional transgressions. Instead, core disgust sensitivity was a significant independent predictor of wrongness judgments for both moral and conventional transgressions, as well as moralization of conventional transgressions. Contamination disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor of wrongness judgments about conventional, but not moral, transgressions, and was a marginal predictor of moralization of conventional transgressions.
Discussion
Replicating and extending the results of Study 1, Study 2 showed that individual differences in trait physical disgust were related to moral judgments, even when controlling for a number of potential confounds, including conservatism, trait anger, trait anxiety, and gender. Interestingly, the influence of trait disgust seemed to be driven most strongly by sensitivity to core disgust stimuli, which include body products, foods, and animals such as insects and rats. Animal reminder disgust, related to blood and injuries, was clearly uncorrelated with moral judgments, and contamination disgust, related to perceived threat of contagion, was more weakly correlated with judgment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine different domains of disgust in relation to moral judgment, and the results require replication. However, they are potentially of considerable theoretical interest, given that different types of disgust are associated with different patterns of psychophysiological activity, neural activation (Harrison, Gray, Gianaros, & Critchley, 2010) , and psychopathology (Olatunji, Connolly, & David, 2008; Olatunji, Sawchuk, de Jong, & Lohr, 2006; Olatunji et al., 2007) .
General Discussion
The goal of the current research was to examine whether individual differences in the tendency to experience disgust toward physical stimuli are related to moral judgments about pure transgressions that do not refer to physical disgust stimuli. Across two studies, we found that individuals who are higher in trait physical disgust judge violations of both morality and social convention to be more wrong than do their low-disgust counterparts. Those higher in trait physical disgust were also more likely to moralize social conventions, that is, to view them as possessing morally important qualities, such as being independent of authority. Neither of these effects was accounted for by a more general tendency to experience negative emotion, since including trait anxiety and trait anger as covariates did not eliminate trait disgust effects. Social conservatism also did not account for the influence of physical disgust. Importantly, because none of our transgression items refer to physically disgusting stimuli, our data suggest that the influence of disgust in the moral domain is not limited to issues of purity or bodily norms.
These results contribute to an ongoing debate over the scope of moral disgust. Although it is generally agreed that disgust plays some role in morality, there is disagreement over whether disgust's role is confined to transgressions that contain physical disgust stimuli (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Pizarro et al., 2011; Rozin et al., 1999) . Our data add to several other lines of evidence suggesting that moral disgust extends beyond the purity domain (Eskine et al., 2011; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Jones & Fitness, 2008; Simpson et al., 2006; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; see Chapman & Anderson, 2013 , for a review). However, there is competing evidence that supports a more specific role for disgust in purityrelated transgressions (Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012; Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999) . One possible explanation for the inconsistent findings is differences in the types of moral stimuli that were used. Recent work has suggested that morality may consist of several different domains, including concerns about harm and fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity (Graham et al., 2009) . Disgust may be involved in some, but not all, of these domains. Our data indicate that purity is not the only domain in which disgust plays a role, but more work is needed to map out the specific domains in which it is involved.
Another recent direction in moral psychology has been to explore differences in the perceived moral relevance of different moral domains. For example, Western conservatives place much more emphasis on authority, loyalty, and purity than do 4 DS-R scores also significantly predicted wrongness ratings for moral and conventional transgressions, and moralization of conventional transgressions, when they were the only predictor in the model. 5 Tolerances for the Core, Contamination, and Animal Reminder subscales were 0.68, 0.69, and 0.75, respectively, suggesting little reason to be concerned about multicollinearity. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
liberals (Graham et al., 2009) , and cultures also vary in how central these domains are to their moral codes (Shweder et al., 1997) . Our data add to this emerging literature by showing that differences in trait physical disgust may also play a role in determining the types of issues that are perceived to belong in the moral domain. Individuals higher in trait physical disgust rated transgressions of social convention as being more wrong than did individuals lower in trait disgust, and they were also more likely to moralize these types of transgressions. These findings suggest that disgust may not merely be a consequence of perceiving a moral transgression, but may-at least under some circumstances-be able to push neutral acts into the moral domain. That said, we do not subscribe to the view that disgust is sufficient for moralization, as there are many behaviors that are disgusting but not immoral (Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009) . Instead, given a nonmoral proscription (such as a social convention), differences in trait or state disgust may contribute to shifting norms into the moral domain (Pizarro et al., 2011) . The interpretation just offered implies that disgust may be associated with a qualitative change in the moral status of a behavior, not just a quantitative one. One potential concern with this argument is that our social convention stimuli were rated as less wrong than our moral transgressions. Thus, it is possible This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
that social conventions are just milder moral transgressions, in which case elevated moralization of these items among higherdisgust participants may just be another sign of greater moral criticism, rather than a change in the boundaries of morality.
Although it is true that violations of social convention are generally judged to be less wrong than violations of morality (Turiel et al., 1987) , past work has shown that even very minor moral transgressions are still judged to be independent of authority, whereas more significant conventional transgressions are judged to be dependent on authority or social context (Tisak & Turiel, 1988) . In other words, previous work provides evidence that a milder moral transgression is not a social convention. Moreover, the factor analysis conducted in Study 2 also suggests that our moral and conventional transgressions were, with few exceptions, more closely correlated within categories than between. Our data are thus consistent with the suggestion that heightened trait physical disgust is associated with a change in the moral status of social conventions.
In summary, we found that individual differences in the tendency to experience physical disgust are related to more severe judgments about moral and conventional transgressions, as well as to moralization of social conventions. This relationship held even though none of the items referred to physical disgust stimuli, bodily norms, or violations of sexual purity. These results suggest that disgust may play a wider role in morality than has sometimes been argued. In turn, they also support the idea that disgust underwent a dramatic shift in function upon entering the moral domain (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000) . Although disgust may have originated in defending the body against poison and disease, its role in morality appears to extend far beyond this sphere.
